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Аннотация 
Одним из способов достижения успешного функционирования стратегического 
альянса является обеспечение удовлетворенности фирм-партнеров в сотрудничестве. 
Основная задача данного исследования заключается в измерении взаимосвязи и корре-
ляции между мотивацией стратегического альянса, стоимостью трансакционных из-
держек и результатами стратегического альянса. Основная цель заключается в выяв-
лении ключевых факторов, влияющих на экономику стратегического альянса. В данной 
статье рассмотрены четыре гипотезы. Данные оценивались с использованием различ-
ных статистических методов. Положительные результаты значительно перевеши-
вают отрицательные. 
Ключевые слова: стратегический альянс, экономика, мотивация, трансакцион-
ные издержки, доверие. 
 
Abstract 
One way to achieve successful functioning of strategic alliance is to ensure that partner 
firms are satisfied. The main task of this research is to measure the interrelationship and cor-
relations between strategic alliance motivations, transaction cost economics, and its strategic 
alliance outcomes. The main goal is to identify the key factors that influence the economics of 
strategic alliance. Four hypotheses were tested. The data was assessed using different statis-
tical methods. The positive outcomes significantly outweigh the negative ones. 




A relationship between organizations contains not only utilitarian economic factors but 
also psychological behavioral factors such as trust, commitment and satisfaction (Zafirovski, 
2005; Zineldin et al. 2014). Even, social exchange theory (SET) is based on economical and 
psychological behaviorism because the establishing, developing and sustaining human or inter 
organizational relationships goes beyond the utilitarian economics (Zineldin et al., 2014).  
Strategic alliance and inter-organizational relations can be examined from a wide range 
of theoretical starting points. They include strategic management, organization theory, eco-
nomic and industrial analysis, network theory, game theory, the sociology and psychology 
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theories, to name only the most obvious. Models of bilateral and multilateral (e.g. multi-state 
coalitions) relationships can also be applied to the study of strategic alliances. May and Tate 
(2011) found evidences that strategic alliance is determined by economic and social-
psychological variables. More interestingly, the collaboration phenomenon challenges re-
searchers to extend these theories by highlighting the complexity of the inter-organizational 
relationships. This makes strategic alliance research intellectually challenging. Paavo and 
Hallikas, 2011). 
Despite the increased interests of entering and managing strategic alliances, the field 
still theoretically and empirically lacks a framework to describe the conditions and dynamics 
leading to the understand the economics of strategic alliances (Park and Ungson, 2001; 
Zineldin and Dodourova, 2005; Valent, 2008).In economics and related disciplines, the con-
cept transaction cost can be defined as a cost incurred to make an economic exchange.This 
study focuses on transaction cost economics and the outcomes of strategic alliances.  
According to our knowledge there is no research on the interrelationship between strate-
gic alliance motivations (SAM), transaction cost economics (TCE) and its strategic alliance 
outcomes (SAO). Thus, the main task of this research is to measure the interrelationship and 
correlations between SAM, TCE and SAO. The main goal is to identify the key factors that 
influence the economics of strategic alliance. 
 
RESULTS AND ITS DISCUSSION 
 
Strategic Alliance (SA) 
According to Chandler’s definition (1982), strategy is «the determination of the basic 
long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out those goals». 
«SA is a formal agreement between two or more business organizations to pursue a set of 
private and common interests through the sharing of resources in contexts involving uncertainty 
over outcomes. Depending on its purpose, an SA may temporary or enduring». (Arin˜o, 2003) 
So strategic alliances are entered into by two or more partners to pursue long-term goals 
beneficial for all the partners, and this characteristic differentiates strategic alliances from 
other forms of partnerships.The prior strategic alliance research have added to our knowledge 
the main reasons of why strategic alliances forms and the enablers for initiation success and 
the achieved benefits (e.g. Zineldin, 2002; Zineldin and Jonsson, 2000; Lemoine and Dagnæs, 
2003). Most of previous strategic alliance studies suffer from some weaknesses (Dyer and 
Ouchi, 1993; Geringer and Louis, 1991; Niern, et al., 1995; Brucellaria, 2000; Zineldin and 
Jonsson, 2000; Wheelen and Hungar, 2000. Zineoldin&Dodourova, 2005) Some have failed 
to use formative indicators to differentiate between failed and successful alliances, instead 
opting for either a descriptive case approach or respondent based reports of alliance existence 
(Zineldin, et al 2015). 
The main result of previous studies on strategic alliances showed that there are noticea-
ble differences in the motives for entering into an alliance (Zineldin, 2005). The culture is al-
so influencing the complexity of strategic alliance relational constructs such as trust, com-
mitment, co-operation, dependence, communication, adaptations and the economics of the 
alliance in form of costs and financial exchanges and outcomes. SA is also influenced by the 
experience, previous termination, alliance types, organization size and age. Larger companies 
tend to gain greater benefits from the SA than smaller firms (Terzivski, 2000; Heimeriks and 
Duysters, 2007). Rothaemel et al. (2006) found that alliance type and alliance experience 
moderate the alliance relationships and product development. According to Zineldin et al 
(2014), the termination of the previous alliance relationships refers to the capability and 
unique knowledge that firms deploy for the formation, management, and termination of alli-
ances (Lambe et al., 2002; Ziggers et al., 2010). 




The concept value creation (VC) is also a critical motivation for the existence of SA. VC 
defined by Rai (2013) as the total sum of value that is created during alliance activities. The fol-
lowing approaches have been adopted by rai (2013)to measure the value creation of SA: 
(a) financial measures such as firms’ profitability, net income, return on investment 
and market gains and shares; 
(b) measures of alliance performance and success in terms of alliance duration, 
stability, termination, andassessment of partners’ ongoing relationship and fit; 
(c) subjective measures such as managers’ satisfaction with alliance performance and 
the fulfillment ofstrategic goals;  
Understanding the perceived quality of the SA is critical to predict the firm’s future in-
teractions with its allied partner as well as the healthiness of the existing cooperation (Choo, 
et al. 2009). 
Trust and co-operation are critical factors that affect level of the success and outcomes 
of strategic alliances (Digman and Parast, 2007). Prajogo et al., (2012) found that there is a 
positive correlation between the strategic alliance trust (SAT) and strategic alliance operation-
al performance which impacts on its costs and outcome performances. 
Finally, the majority of previous studies have focused on profit-seeking firms as atomis-
tic players. But, strategy researchers, who rely on economic perspectives underlying transac-
tion cost economics (TCE) argue that the focus on TEC can contribute to SA competitive            
advantage. 
 
Strategic Alliance Motivations (SAM) 
A specific reason for the increased attention placed on interorganizational relationships 
is difficult to pinpoint.But, there are as many possible benefits to the formation of an interor-
ganizational relationships alliance as there are motives for entering into these collaborative 
relationships. Heide and Stump (1995) address the issue of benefits and motives by stating 
that alliances are based on the «assumption that relationships are established in order to en-
hance some aspect of performance». Nevertheless, research on performance objectives of 
firms entering into alliances and the resulting achievements is severely lacking (Elmuti et al., 
2005), as is the understanding of what types of alliances exist and what are the unique mo-
tives underlying the development these different types.  
The SAM has received growing interest during the last several years. Previous studies 
has identified different strategic alliance motivations explained from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, including transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1991), re-
source dependency (Pfeffer& Nowak, 1976), organizational learning (Grant, 1996), strategic 
positioning (Porter & Fuller, 1986) and institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Costs 
and risks sharing, entering new markets and achieving competitive advantages (Elmuti et al. 
2005).Technological motives is also recent discussed motive (Taylor, 2005). As shown in 
Figure 1, (Zineldin and Dodourova, 2005) summarized and synthesize the motives for strate-
gic alliances into four categories: financial, technological, managerial and strategic as follows:  
1) FM: Financial motivation - we classify in this category motives related to cost reduc-
tion and profit generation (e.g. joint investment, reduced inventory).  
2) TM: Technological motivation - motives that facilitate the supply process (e.g. shar-
ing technology, joint new technological advances).  
3) MM: Managerial motivation - such motives as interdependence, supply base reduc-
tion and loyalty, managerial effectiveness.  
4) SM: Strategic motivation - motives that are related to competitive positioning of the 
supply process (e.g. future direction, achieving core competency). 
 




Figure 1 - Four Motives of Strategic Alliance (SA) 
 
Although, learning and internalization of core competencies is one of the key motives 
behind alliance strategies (Taylor, 2005), strategic alliances often result in failure because of 
human resource management during the post-alliance integration period (Yalabika, 2013). 
However, enhancing knowledge about the positive and negative outcomes of the SA should 
direct future research and contribute to a reduction in alliance failures through improved man-
agerial practices (Ireland et al., 2002). SA should sustain common goals, strategies, and pur-
sued these collectively (Sebalj et al., 2007). 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Theory 
Transactional economies can simply be defined as the process of savings in the process 
of exchange of intermediate inputs. In such an event, firms emerge as organisations that chal-
lenge the market as an alternative mechanism for governing transactions.  
A different issue involves the design of strategic alliances based on a transaction cost 
economics (TCE) and transaction benefits perspectives (Williamson 1975). To account for the 
emergence of strategic alliances as well as their operation, a number of theories and models 
have been proposed, such as transaction cost economics (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985) 
and game theory (Parkhe, 1993). 
In transaction cost economics, according to Das and Teng (2000) the decision of a 
firm’s ownership focuses on minimizing the sum of transaction and production costs (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1975). Many researchers, howver, suggest that strategic alliances should 
be preferred when the transaction costs associated with an exchange are intermediate and not 
high enough to justify vertical integration (Gulati, 1995). 
There are common factors between TCE and game theory where the parties of, for in-
stance, a strategic alliance contract are assumed to have an understanding of the strategic situ-
ation within which they are located and position themselves accordingly. According to Wil-
lismson (2007), «TCE views governance as a means by which to relieve the oppressive logic 
of «bad games», of which the prisoners’ dilemma is an exemplar.»… «Economizing on trans-
action cost is taken to be the cutting edge, where this is implemented through the discriminat-
ing alignment hypothesis, to wit: transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with 
governance structures, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a transaction 
cost economizing outcome». 
TCE reject the standard non-cooperative model because it rely on a cooperative game 
theory where all participants must realize a net cooperative gain over the non-cooperative sta-
tus-quo equilibrium. If the ratio of excludable benefits is small, cooperative gains from im-
proved efficiency can arise as allies form tighter linkages and sacrifice autonomy. Coopera-
tion can take the form of in-creased investment spending, equipment standardization, com-
mon logistics, shared goals and strategies, coordinated activities, common infrastructure, and 
different collaborative projects (Sanler and Hartley, 2001). 
 




Strategic Alliance Outcomes (SAO)  
nd Strategic Alliance Overall Performance (SAOP) 
Partnerships, alliances, collaboration, and buyer/manufacturer relationships in general 
have received much attention during the 1990s. Reports from industry of shorter cycle times, 
fewer quality defects, reduced costs, and streamlined processes resulting from closer working 
relationships with manufacturers have suggested a clearer understanding of the major factors 
affecting Strategic alliance relationships.  
To establish effective strategic alliance relationships, organizations are using manufac-
turer selection criteria such as product quality, product availability, delivery reliability, and 
product performance and continuous improvement efforts (Vonderembse, 1999).. Ho (1999), 
argues the following: «unless organizations learn to identify and reform strategic business 
processes they will never be able to exploit changes in the market place. Profitability, market 
share and goodwill are not bestowed on organizations by some divine right. Instead the mar-
ket awards these benefits to organizations that listen to and satisfy the voice of the customer». 
In order to realize the full potential of such relationships, the organization needs to de-
velop an appropriate and systematic strategic processes including activities and action plans to 
achieve an effective and sustainable economics of strategic alliance. 
One way to achieve sound economics of strategic alliance is to ensure that partner firms 
are satisfied. The level of satisfaction experienced is the outcome of the interorganizational 
relationship (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Frazier, Spekman, and O’Neal 1988). Previous re-
searchers have suggested that there is a positive relationship between cooperation, cost lead-
erships, profitability and satisfaction(Zineldin&Jonsson, 2000). The cooperative efforts of SA 
should result in greater trust, efficiency and the achievement of goals, which leads to higher 
level of satisfaction. Social network studies investigating outcomes of interorganizational re-
lationships haveexamined a variety of partner of overall collaboration performance and out-
comes such as innovative outcomes (Shan, Walker, &Kogut, 1994), technical and technologi-
cal outcomes such as patents (Stuart, 1998), and reputation (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) 
and gain a competitive advantage in comparison to their competitors. 
Satisfaction is an emotional response to the difference between what partners are expect 
and what they ultimately receive or acheive. Satisfaction influences the market share and 
profitability of a firm and is an essential indicator of the profits of the SA partners. Studies 
show that when partners are asked for their assessment of overall SA performance – and, in 
particular, when they are asked to report their satisfaction with the SA – they evaluate not on-
ly the SA outcomes, but also the SA process. When entering an SA, each partner brings cer-
tain initial expectations about the interactions and the outcomes (Kumar and Nti, 1998), and 
may influence the emergence of new goals for the SA. A specific measure such as strategic 
goals fulfilment can also capture outcome performance. According to Arino (2003) «net spill-
over effects and overall performance satisfaction are single-item measures whereas strategic 
goal fulfilment is a composite one, respondents may reflect their general feeling about the SA 
in the former measures, but not in the latter. This underscores how important it is to develop 
new measures that capture process performance and unbundle it from outcome performance». 
Partners in a strategic alliance can create new value by reducing the transaction cost, the 
uncertainty and the level of the financial and practical risks associated with the purchase or 
joint investment. In such a relationship, there is a great opportunity to gain access to vast in-
formation about common needs, aspirations and plans, which provides a substantial competi-
tive advantage by strengthening strategic cooperation (Zineldin, 2004). 
 




Based on the literature review and the foregoing discussion, the following hypotheses 
are proposed:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between SAM and TCE 
H2: There is a positive relationship between SAO and TCE 
H3: There is a positive relationship between SAT and TEC 
H4: There is a positive relationship between SAOP and TEC 
 
 
Figure 2: Research Hypotheses Transaction Cost Economics interrelation and 
correlation with SAM, SAO, SAT and SAOP 
 
Recall that our hypothesized relationships are presumed to be relevant to any long-term 
interorganizations relationship which is difficult to terminate quickly. 
 
Methodology 
This research is based on a cross cultural approach which considers different industry 
sectors located in different countries – China, Japan and Mauritius. The choice of the coun-
tries is a result of our networks with different researchers in the above mentioned countries 
and the availability and access to the needed data. As part of the study, CEO’s from Mauritian 
industries also participated in the survey. Although a small country in size, Mauritius is classi-
fied as a middle-income country with an emergent consumer market and ranks first in Africa 
for global competitiveness (World Economic Forum, 2013). It is often cited as an example for 
the African continent. The geographical spreading and cultural differences provide a good 
base for the generalisation of the study results and outcomes (Zineldinet al, 2015).  
 
The Sample 
The snowball sampling approach has successfully been used to gain respondents. Ac-
cording to snowball sampling, respondents are chosen from the professional and friendship 
networks of existing members of the sample (Thompson and Collin, 2002). The period of 
snowballing was 4 months. The questionnaire was designed as web-survey with a link to the 
survey platform or portal on line and as an e-mail survey. The respondents were encouraged 
to login with the specific password to conduct online reply or to return the answered survey to 
the researchers e-mail. By end of the three months a total of 112 (N 112) full completed ques-
tionnaires were received from respondents had strategic alliances with different suppliers, dis-
tributors and other supply chain actors. The sample profile is presented in Table 1. Most of 




the respondents were primarily male (61,6 %). Almost 44 % had previous failure or experi-
ence of strategic alliance termination for different reasons. 
Table 1 - Sample profile (N112) 
Variables/profile (%) Mean Std d. 
 








Length of the alliance, SA 
long (over 15 years) 
medium (over 5 to 14) 





























The majority of the existing strategic alliances (56,3 %) were very stable with long term 
partnership over 15 years. 49 % were large companies with over 500 employees and 32 % are 
small with 1-10 employees. 57,2 % of the strategic alliance partners were national partners, 
22,5 were European firms, 9,6 % USA firms and 10,7 % Were form other countries.  
 
Scales 
Scales consisting of multiple items were developed to measure each of the TCE, SAM, 
SAO and SAOP construct. Given our conceptualization of strategic alliance trust (SAT) and 
commitment, it was essential that the measures captured both the importance of the SA rela-
tionship to respondents and their beliefs about working to maintain the collaborative SA. To 
the extent possible we draw upon scales which had been used in economics, management, so-
cial networks, psychology and marketing literature to further the process of validation for es-
tablished scales. All constructs were measured through multiple-item scales and a 5–point 
Likert-type response format.  
 
Reliability and Validity 
One of the major concerns which must be addressed is whether the scales measure what 
they are supposed to measure. It is also necessary to test the degree of internal consistency, or 
degree of inter-correlation among several measures for the same construct (Zineldin et al, 
2015). Some reliability and validity tests were conducted. Chronbach’s coefficient alpha was 
used to assess the degree of internal consistency of within a particular scale. From a psycho-
metric point of view, Alpha values of the study construct subscales have been validated in 
numerous studies, as well as in several different cultures (Zineldinet al, 2015). According to 
Churchill (1979) and Fornell and Larcker (1981), 0.70 or higher are considered to be accepta-
ble, with 0.60 being acceptable for new scales. As shown in table 2, all scales exceeded this 
threshold. Some descriptive statistics are shown in table 2. 
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TCE 8 28,589 5,888 ,652 
SAM 4 19,169 2,044 ,737 
SAO 8 30,160 5,292 ,632 
SAT 6 21,491 3,705 ,679 
SAOP 6 22,812 2,3347 ,688 
 
Our five constructs of the 32 sub-item scales had a good reliability score (Cronbach            
α = 0.76). 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Strategic alliance outcomes (SAO) was measured using both monetary outcomes, name-
ly, profits, market share and nonmonetary outcomes, which included gains in reputation, 
learning, innovation, and patents. Strategic alliance trust (SAT) was using items such as keep-
ing promises and sharing information. Strategic alliance motivations (SAM) was measured by 
financial motivation (FM), Technological motivation (TM), strategic motivation (SM) and 
Managerial motivation (MM). Strategic alliance overall performance (SAOP) was including 
satisfaction of the partners, cooperation and communication, fulfilling the planned and ex-
pected needs and goals, the positive outcomes are significantly outweigh the negative ones.  
Table 3 shows the correlations between each of the dependent, i.e. TCE and independent 
variables. Majority of the bivariate correlations are positive and several of them are statistical-
ly significant. In particular, the correlations between the TCE and all other independent varia-
bles are all positive. Only SAM is not significant in relation to SAT and SAOP.  
 
Table 3 - Correlation between scale variables Pearson Correlations 
 
 
TCE SAM SAO SAT SAOP 
TCE 1     
SAM ,247** 1    
SAO ,566** ,458** 1   
SAT ,361** ,159 ,423** 1 * 
SAOP ,549** ,175 ,286** ,665** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Table 3 also reveals several strong correlations between the transaction cost economics 
(TCE) and the strategic alliance outcomes (SAO) (r = .57, p < 0.00) as well as the strategic 
alliance overall performance (SAOP) (r = ,55, p < 0.00). The two strongest correlates of stra-
tegic alliance outcomes (SAO) were also TCE (r = ,57, p < 0.00)) and strategic alliance moti-
vation (r = ,46, p < 0.00). and object orientation construct (r = ,56, p < 0.00). The relations of 
the strategic alliance trust (SAT) construe were strongest with SAO (r = ,42, p < 0.00) and 
also TCE (r = ,36, p < 0.00) but not significant with SAM. The SAOP variable had SAT as 
the strongest correlation (r = ,67 p < 0.00) and weakest correlation with SAO (r = ,29,                      
p < 0.00) and no significance at all with SAM. SAM was, however, the weakest correlate of 
all other variables regarding the transaction cost Economic issues.  
 





The key dependent variable to test each of our hypotheses represented the strategic ben-
efits that accrue to the focal organization from Strategic alliance collaboration. One composite 
measure for transaction cost economics (TCE) of the strategic alliance that included decreas-
ing costs, decreasing prices, decreasing risks, lower fixed capital and sharing expenses and 
reducing competitive uncertainty, was created to test Hypotheses 1 through 4. 
To test the research hypotheses, a regression was conducted for the dependent variables 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and all independent variables, SAM, SMO, SAT and 
SAOP. The collinearity between several of the independent variables, and the high bivariate 
correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variables, resulted in the 
fact that several strong regression models could be developed. The models presented in table 
4, only contain statistically significant variables, and explain high levels of variance in the 
dependent variable.Table 4 shows the regression results for the 4 hypotheses. SAM was not 
statistically significant, thus the H1 was not supported. SAT had a weak significant, thus H3 
is weakly supported. 
 




P  R²  
   ,509 
SAO ,527 ,000  
SAOP ,556 ,000  
SAT ,223 ,023  
 
Dependent Variable TCE 
The identified independent variables entered in backward and forward procedures (with 
the same final model). The model shows that all variables are statistically significant. It ex-
plains 51 % of the variance in TCE. In this test, the largest β value was .56 which means that 
infrastructure (SAOP) makes strongest contribution to explaining the total success or 
achievement of the economics of strategic alliance. Strategic alliance outcomes (SAO) con-
struct make also good contribution with β ,53. Strategic alliance trust (SAT) showed the low-
est contribution with β ,22. 
SAOP and SAO are the most important variable in the model. It is not very surprising that 
when the positive outcomes outweigh the negative ones is good indication for the sound eco-
nomics of the strategic alliance. Satisfaction is also important SAOP’s indicator to reflect the 
impact of the TCE approach. SAO represented by the monetary outcomes such as profits, mar-
ket share and nonmonetary or soft outcomes such as reputation, learning and patents are major 
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